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ABSTRACT
We propose DIPS (Difficulty-based Incentives for Problem Solving), a simple modification of the
Bitcoin proof-of-work algorithm that rewards blockchain miners for solving optimization problems
of scientific interest. The result is a blockchain which redirects some of the computational resources
invested in hash-based mining towards scientific computation, effectively reducing the amount of
energy ‘wasted’ on mining. DIPS builds the solving incentive directly in the proof-of-work by
providing a reduction in block hashing difficulty when optimization improvements are found. A
key advantage of this scheme is that decentralization is preserved and no additional protocol layers
are required on top of the standard blockchain. We study two incentivization schemes and provide
simulation results showing that DIPS is able to reduce the amount of hash-power used in the network
while generating solutions to optimization problems.
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1 Introduction
Energy spent hashing in Proof of Work (PoW) is critical for guaranteeing the integrity of transactions on the ledger.
However, the information that results from the computations in itself is of low value. More specifically, the outcome
of mining a block is simply a proof that there exists a nonce for which the hash of a given block is lower than some
threshold. Naturally, this knowledge is not applicable outside of the blockchain itself. Mining protocols which secure
the network and are themselves informative have therefore been an attractive goal since the early days of blockchain
[1, 2, 3]. Meanwhile, crowd sourcing efforts have been successful in showing that solutions to difficult scientific
problems can be discovered by a large community. [4, 5, 6] However, current crowd-sourcing models offer few
incentives for participation which limits the size of the user-base. On the other hand, cryptocurrency mining has been
shown to offer a very strong incentive scheme and currently draws a much larger pool of contributors. Including
scientific computing in the mining protocol of a blockchain (more specifically a cryptocurrency) would therefore
introduce and incentivize a larger community to solving scientific problems.
1.1 Related Work
We borrow the term ‘useful work’ [7] to describe protocols which aim at incentivizing computations with real-world
applications other than securing blockchain integrity, while acknowledging that this is not to say that standard PoW is
not ‘useful’. An obvious application of computational resources to ‘useful work’ is finding solutions to problems of
scientific interest such as NP-Complete problems or optimization tasks.
‘Useful work’ protocols can be grouped in two major types: economy-based and mining-based. The former has been
proposed in works such as CureCoin [2], and Coinami [3] which use the interest in cryptocurrencies to reward users
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who complete certain tasks such as DNA alignments or protein folding directly with tokens. However, for the most
part the blockchain protocol remains untouched and PoW is still required in its entirety, typically with some additional
centralization. On the other hand, mining-based approaches attempt to replace PoW with alternative forms of work.
Proposed methods can vary widely in this category. Protocols such as PrimeCoin [1] and Conquering Generals [8]
attempt to fully replace the classical PoW problem of block hashing to another NP-Complete problem. These problems
are picked such that they preserve the following properties:
1. Solving is difficult (hash functions are non-invertible)
2. Difficulty can be easily tuned (target value of hash digest determines difficulty)
3. Fast solution verification (computing and comparing hashes is constant time)
4. Easy to generate new problems (block data defines a problem)
However, very few problems of scientific interest can satisfy all of these criteria. The first protocol which supports
arbitrary NP-Complete problems addresses these constraints by retaining a portion hash-based PoW [9]. Miners
optionally submit a block at a reduced hashing difficulty if the block includes a valid solution to a problem selected
by the network. If a solution to the problem is not found, the protocol converges to Bitcoin. The difficulty of the
problem is estimated by the frequency of blocks mined with solutions and difficulty is adjusted accordingly to maintain
a desired block time. Recently, [10] proposed a special case of [9] which allows problem solvers to submit blocks
without hashing (reduced difficulty of zero) if they provide a solution. Attacks where malicious miners pre-solve many
problems to win a large portion of consecutive blocks are prevented by enforcing that at least %50 of blocks be mined
classically (effective reduced difficulty half of classical difficulty). Finally, [11] rewards solutions to ‘useful’ problems
with votes in a hybrid Proof of Work/Proof of Stake model which, by definition, reduces the required amount of hashing.
However, this also comes with a complex additional layer of governance and potential centralization.
1.2 Contribution
Here we build on [9] to provide stronger problem-solving incentives while maintaining simplicity, full decentralization,
and blockchain security. We describe in Section 2 a novel difficulty adjustment scheme which provides stronger problem
solving incentives. In Section 3 we present simulations of the resulting network behaviour. Finally, in Section 4 we
address potential attacks.
2 Protocol
Here we describe the DIPS protocol to incentivize the mining network to solve an agreed upon optimization problem
through mining difficulty reductions. For simplicity, we phrase an optimization problem P as a sequence of NP-
Complete decision problems of the form ‘does there exist a solution with objective value greater than some fixed
target?’. As an example,P can be a specific graph for which we want to find the maximal clique. Since verifying that
a clique is maximal is NP-Hard, we let the network solve a series of decision problems by proposing larger and larger
cliques. Solutions to the decision problems can be checked in constant or linear time (is this a clique of size k?).
2.1 Single update
In the first version (v1) of the protocol (see Ref. [9]), miners are given the option of mining blocks ‘classically’ (as in
the Bitcoin protocol, Ref. [12]) with a given difficulty db or by including solutions to a givenP in a block and mining
that block with a reduced difficulty dr. Since there are two difficulties in v1, two conditions are required to be satisfied
to update the difficulties. This situation is in contrast to the Bitcoin protocol, where a single difficulty is updated using a
single condition: the average time required to mine each block T is fixed (taken to be 10 minutes in Bitcoin). The first
condition used to update the difficulty in v1 is the same as in the Bitcoin protocol. In addition to this condition, the
difficulties are updated so that the average ratio between dr and db, η is fixed,〈
dr
db
〉
= η, (1)
where 〈Q〉 represents the long-time average of the quantity Q. As is the case in Bitcoin, the difficulties are updated
after N1 blocks are mined (N1 = 2016 in Bitcoin). In v1 both difficulties are updated independent of how many blocks
are mined including a solution toP . Moreover, as is the case with Bitcoin, measures are taken to ensure that difficulty
does not change too quickly. In particular, the protocol enforces a maximal update factor for the difficulties so that
1
x
≤ d
j+1
i
dji
≤ x, (2)
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where i ∈ {b, r}, dji is the value for di after jN1 blocks and x is the maximum factor by which the difficulties can be
updated. After jN1 blocks, if the difficulty d
j+1
i is calculated so that x < d
j+1
i /d
j
i (d
j+1
i /d
j
i < 1/x) then we take
dj+1i = xd
j
i (d
j+1
i = d
j
i/x) instead.
Although this version of the protocol incentivizes solving NP-complete problems by providing a reduced mining
difficulty (assuming η < 1), dr increases with db since the average value of dr/db is fixed. Therefore, even in the case
where no solutions are submitted, dr can increase. This means that even asP becomes more difficult to solve (which
is expected to happen over time), dr can continue to increase limiting the incentive provided by the network to solve
problems and therefore the number of solutions that the network will find. Consequently, the amount of resources
redirected to solving useful problems will also be limited.
2.2 Independent updates
We propose a second version of the protocol (v2) where miners are again free to submit ‘classical’ blocks with difficulty
db or blocks containing a solution to an NP-complete problem, with difficulty dr. However, in v2 the difficulties db
and dr are updated independently. That is, after N b2 classical blocks have been mined, db is updated so as to keep the
average time spent by the network to mine a classical block fixed (to a predetermined value tb2). Similarly, after N
r
2
blocks have been mined containing a solution, dr is updated so as to keep the average time spent by the network to mine
a block with a solution be fixed (to a predetermined value tr2). Since it becomes increasingly difficult to find solutions to
NP-complete problems, eventually the network might not be able to mine new blocks with the current difficulty dr.
Therefore in the v2 protocol if N b2 consecutive classical blocks are mined, dr is decreased by the maximum factor, x
(dr → dr/x). In this way, even if the problem becomes increasingly difficult to solve, miners that attempt to solve the
problem are incentivized with a proportionally decreased dr. Miners are naturally discouraged from holding on to
their solution until the difficulty is lowered by a large factor since this comes at the risk of other miners finding and
publishing a better solution first.
2.3 Problem Submission
In the type of modified proof-of-work protocol described in the above subsections, some of the hashing power reserved
in traditional blockchains (such as Bitcoin) to ensure the security of the network is diverted to solving an NP-complete
problem,P . The difficulty in finding better and better solutions provides the network with security and replaces the
repeated hashing of proposed blocks. Because the best score ofP will eventually saturate (either when the network no
longer wishes to find a better score or when the optimal score has been found) this modified proof-of-work system will
revert back to the traditional proof-of-work protocol. Therefore, to create a blockchain where NP-complete problems
keep being solved, it might be interesting to consider a system where new problems can be submitted to the network.
The inclusion of new problems in the network can be done in a variety of ways. We leave determining a specific
implementation for a future work and discuss some possible implementations here instead. One possible implementation
could have a committee of users or a group of special nodes chosen (through an election, or otherwise) to submit new
problems once the best score of the current problem has been saturated. Alternatively, but in the same spirit, individuals
(participating in the network, or not) can propose new problems off-chain and the community can vote on which new
problem to replace the current problem with. Once the new problem has been chosen, the blockchain can be hard forked
to ignore solutions to the old (saturated problem) and accept solutions to the new agreed-upon problem.
A different idea for submitting problems would allow any node to submit a problem as long as they stake some number
of tokens (native to the blockchain) on the problem being submitted. This stake is ‘burned’ by the network. Otherwise,
the party submitting the problem could gain free tokens by submitting an easy problem they already have solutions to
and subsequently mining a block at the reduced difficulty and gaining the mining reward. This type of implementation
can be dangerous because if the number of tokens the network requires submitters to stake is too low, new solved
problems will constantly be submitted so that the submitters can mine new blocks with a reduced difficulty for free.
Moreover, submitters can hoard multiple solutions to the same problem that can be used to gain a difficulty reduction
in mining for many consecutive blocks (see section 4 for more details on this type of attack). In contrast, if the stake
required is too high, many users will be discouraged to submit interesting problems.
3 Simulation Results
Here we perform simple experiments to visualize the impact of protocol and parameter choice on the behaviour of the
network. We implement a simulated blockchain with 10 miners performing classical mining and 10 miners problem
solving. As a sample problem, we let the network solve the well-known maximum clique problem on randomly
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Figure 1: Schematic depicting the difference between a blockchain with proof-of-work protocol v1 and v2. The red
blocks are standard blocks that do not contain a solution to a problem (classical blocks), while the blue blocks contain a
solution that results in a score that is better than the current best score ofP (solution blocks). In v1 both db and dr are
updated every N1 blocks. In v2, db is updated every N b2 blocks that do not contain a solution to a problem and dr is
updated every Nr2 blocks that do contain a solution. nr and nb are arbitrary numbers.
generated graphs [13]. At the start of the chain, we generate a random graph and miners apply the Bronn-Kerbosch
[14] algorithm which enumerates cliques until a large enough solution is found. The current largest clique size is stored
in each block. Since mining hardware is typically used only for hashing, we assume miners are concurrently mining at
db while attempting to solve the problem on separate hardware. If a miner finds a clique which beats the current best,
he includes the solution in his next block and begins to mine at a reduced difficulty dr. If he fails to win the next block,
the miner keeps his current best solution to try again in the next block.
In Figure 2 we plot the number of classical and solution blocks as a function of the blockchain height. In a standard
proof-of-work blockchain (such as Bitcoin), there is only one type of block - a classical block. The dashed line in
Figure 2 represents how the number of classical blocks grows with blockchain height in a standard blockchain (they
grow together since they represent the same quantity). In contrast, for the v2 proof-of-work protocol, some of the
hashing power is diverted to solving NP-Complete problems. Therefore there are fewer fully classical blocks mined at a
given blockchain height and therefore, less energy invested by the network to hash blocks. The energy saved is used to
solve NP-Complete problems as indicated by the blue curve, which represents blocks being mined by the network that
contain solutions to NP-Complete problems - solution blocks.
A feature of optimization problems is that eventually the optimal solution to the problem will be found. At this point (or
before) the number of blocks with solutions will saturate because no new solutions can be found. The system reverts
to a standard proof-of-work blockchain. One way to prevent the system from becoming a standard blockchain is to
introduce new problems when the solution saturates (see section 2.3 for a discussion on possible ways to include new
problems). We have simulated the inclusion of a new problem (randomly generated graph) when the best score of the
previous problem saturates (gray vertical lines in Fig. 2). In this way, instead of reaching a point where no more energy
is diverted to solving NP-Complete problems, as the blockchain grows, more energy is diverted to solving these types
4
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Figure 2: Number of classical (red) and solution blocks (blue) mined as a function of the blockchain height using the
simulations described in section 3. The dashed line represents the number of classical blocks mined on a classical
blockchain (such as Bitcoin) as a function of the blockchain height. We have also replaced the problem in the network
by a new one once the best score saturates. The introduction of a new problem is represented by the gray vertical lines.
We use protocol v2 with tb2 = t
r
2 = 0.1s. The update frequency for solution blocks is set to N
b
2 = 10 and N
r
2 = 5 since
at early stages of the problem, solutions are found quickly.
of problems. This energy is loosely represented by the difference in the dashed line and the red curve in Fig. 2, or
equivalently, the blue curve.
We have also studied how this energy is affected by the parameter η. For the v1 protocol, η is a parameter that is
enforced by the network as the difficulties get updated (see section 2.1). In the case of the v2 protocol, η indicates the
initial value of dr/db. As expected, since η is not enforced by the network, the fraction of blocks that are solution
blocks is independent of η for v2 (see Fig. 4). In contrast, in v1, η determines how much incentive the community
is given to solve the blockchain’s optimization problem. Therefore as η decreases (as you move to the right along
the horizontal axis of Fig. 4) we expect the fraction of solution blocks to increase as is shown in Fig. 4. Furthermore,
because the network enforces that the ratio dr/db (long-time) averages to η, db and dr vary together (see Fig. 3a).
After a certain time, as the problem becomes increasingly more difficult to solve, dr will not decrease (and might even
increase if the hashrate of the network increases) if the ratio dr/db has reached its equilibrium value η. Therefore in
v1 a situation is eventually reached where the problem difficulty increases and dr remains fixed i.e. as the problem
becomes more difficult, the hashing difficulty remains constant, increasing the total difficulty of mining a solution block.
This type of situation does not encourage nodes to solve problems. Alternatively, in v2 if no solutions are found, dr
decreases (see section 2.2 and Fig. 3b). Therefore, as the problem becomes more difficult and new solutions become
harder to find, the incentive for finding new solutions increases. These aspects of the protocol are reflected in Fig. 4.
We find that for v2 the best score always saturates, while for v1 the saturation occurs only if η is small enough. As η
5
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Figure 3: Difficulties dr (blue) and db (red) as a function of block height for a typical run of the simulation described in
section 3. For v1 we set η = 200−1, and remaining parameters are kept from Fig. 2
decreases, the fraction of blocks that are solution blocks in v1 tends to the saturated value (average v2 value, given by
the dashed blue line).
4 Potential Attacks
Besides the standard attacks possible with traditional proof-of-work blockchains (e.g. 51% attacks performed by
controlling a majority of the network’s mining power), the DIPS proof of work introduces additional attack avenues.
We name the main attack, to our knowledge, for this version of proof of work the Bubka attack after Ukrainian pole
vaulter Sergey Bubka who obtained many consecutive world records by incrementally improving his score instead of
posting one world record by a large margin. This attack strategy involves finding multiple successive solutions toP
and using these to get an advantage in hashing for multiple blocks in a row. Worse still, one could copy the solutions to
problems from solution blocks and use them to fork the chain at a different block height. This strategy would allow the
attacker to double spend by forking the network at some past block and creating the longest chain with less than 51% of
the network’s hashing power. Estimating the exact fraction of hashing power required for a double-spend attack in this
case is not straightforward and depends on, among other factors, the ratio dr/db at the time of the attack, the rate at
which the network finds new solutions to the problem, the hash rate of the network, and the values of the parameters
Nr2 and N
b
2 . We leave the exploration of this question for future work.
Other attacks such as well-connected miners claiming other miners solutions as their own are addressed in [11] with
protocols that are fully compatible with DIPS.
There are several options for addressing this threat on the social layer of the network. Unlike in other proposed methods,
mining a solution to a block still requires a hashing step, the network could therefore choose a large enough update
frequency (small enough value of Nr2 ) to rapidly increase mining difficulty if solutions are posted in rapid succession.
Additionally, users could follow higher transaction ‘confirmation times’ or not allow long consecutive chains of blocks
with solutions to the problem.
5 Conclusion
In this article we have compared two modified proof-of-work protocols that divert energy from mining by hashing
blocks to solving NP-Complete problems (useful work). We have studied, through simulations, the dependence on the
total diverted energy on different parameters.
Although this article provides a protocol that can convert the energy used by miners to a form of useful work (solving
NP-Complete problems), creating a fully functioning and useful blockchain using any one of the two protocols (v1 or
v2) would require the understanding of other aspects of system. For example, a concrete protocol to add new problems
to the network must be developed. Moreover, a standard way of storing and solving submitted problems must be
established. Other works have made some effort to solve these problems[11, 10], however more work is needed to adapt
these solutions for use in the proof-of-work protocols v1 and v2. We believe protocols such as DIPS are an important
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Figure 4: Fraction of blocks mined with a solution after 200 total blocks for the proof-of-work protocol v1 (red) and v2
(blue) as a function of η. In v1, η is enforced by the network, while in v2 it is the initial ratio dr/db. The fraction of
blocks with solutions does not depend on the value of η for v2. The blue dashed line is the average value of the fraction
of blocks with solutions over values of η. For v1 the fraction of solution blocks converges to the v2 value (dashed blue
line) in the limit where η → 0. Each point represents an average of 10 independent blockchain instances of height 200.
Parameters are chosen as in Fig. 1
step towards combining the potential of crowd-sourcing initiatives (such as Folding@Home [5] and Phylo [4] which
have resulted in new solutions for important problems) with the strong incentive structures native to blockchains.
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